Some blue penniesDid the SNP’s Penny For Scotland cost them the 1999 election? Eddie Barnes seems to think so, in an otherwise fair blog post on the Steamie. Sure, it was their most notable campaign slogan, and sure, they definitely didn’t win in 1999.

But was that what the 1999 election was about? I’d argue that 1999 was primarily about the mere fact of the Parliament itself. New Labour were still in honeymoon mode down south, boom and bust was supposedly over forever, and voting for a Parliament itself was the exciting political step for most of the electorate.

In 1997 45.5% of Scotland had voted Labour and just 22% SNP. Just two years later, following the supposedly disastrous Penny For Scotland campaign, the SNP were up 5% on that on the list and up nearly 7% in the constituencies.

In 2002, under John Swinney, they dropped the policy because Labour were then raising NI and so circumstances had changed. Understandable logic (and the David McLetchie quote in there is still fresh, incidentally). And this decision was surely in line with the smart advice that people are lying when they tell pollsters they want better services and are prepared to pay for them?

Yet the 2003 result was much worse for the new-style low-tax (or steady-tax, they would say) SNP. Their vote fell on the 1999 level by 5% in the constituencies and 6.5% on the list. Would it have gone better for them with a retained Penny For Scotland? Who knows. That’s the problem with “political science”: it’s not science, there are no repeatable experiments, and no controls.

Furthermore, even if they’d got a better result in 2003 than 1999 it wouldn’t have proved the point. Scientists and skeptic bloggers always remind us not to confuse correlation with causation. Ice-cream sales don’t increase deaths by drowning, nor do firefighters increase the size of fires. The same is true in politics. The factors are much more complicated and the temptation to fall back on explanations that suit pre-existing perspectives is strong.

Was the change of SNP leadership not more of a reason for the 2003 switch away from them? Or perhaps the view that Labour wouldn’t be radical in office and the SNP couldn’t replace them led to the support for Greens and Socialists. And their narrow 2007 success was surely more about a credible alternative government in waiting (and FM in waiting) taking on a tired administration, one tied to the increasingly unpopular Blair government. It certainly wasn’t because they still weren’t proposing a Penny For Scotland and that fact had taken four years to sink in.

Eddie suggests we Greens won’t get “a thumping vote of support” for identifying cuts we wouldn’t make and progressive ways to boost Scotland’s budget. Maybe he’ll be proved right, but if no other party in Parliament were to put a practical alternative to the cuts within Holyrood’s existing powers into their manifesto then the Scottish electorate would be looking forward to a much narrower choice. Whatever 2003 shows, more than a third of the electorate were at least ready to back parties with positions to the left of where the SNP (and Labour) are now.