In my former blogging life under the SNP Tactical Voting banner, I thoroughly enjoyed considering counter-intuitive votes that would ultimately lead to a preferred result for the voter. For example, voting Lib Dem in a constituency to try getting an extra SNP MSP in on the regional vote, all to Labour’s detriment. Real high brow stuff.
Looking down the psephological line we have European elections (straight PR, boringly worthy) and an independence referendum (simple Yes/No), so there’s no scope for any tactical voting.
Or is there?
My thoughts on this were pricked into life when a friend stated quite decidedly that independence would be a bad thing for Scotland, but he was going to vote Yes anyway. I know, my gast was at a flabber too. What is he thinking? Well, hear him out.
His view is that, because Yes Scotland are going to lose so convincingly (his words, not mine), he thought that a narrow win for the No camp was in Scotland’s best interests rather than a good old fashioned humping. So, he will do his best to get it as close to 45%/55% as he can, with his one vote. Scots, and the SNP, can still hold their heads up high and not be the laughing stock of the country.
It’s an interesting theory and it makes one realise that there are really five distinct results from this coming referendum, with five distinct outcomes:
A clear No win (say, 57%+):
Forget the hanging chads and missing ballot boxes in Glenrothes, this is a referendum result that isn’t too close to call. The SNP would have to conclude that it has made its best independence arguments and failed, pushing back any subsequent referendum for a generation.
The constitutional debate in the run up to the Holyrood election would turn to Devo Max vs the Status Quo and the various permutations in between and outwith. There would also be a decade where devolved issues can be focussed on and flexed within the current powers of the Scottish Parliament. There is no way of knowing whether the SNP or Labour would be the dominant party over this decade with Scots already confirming that they are impressed with how the SNP manages devolved Scotland, so the referendum could be quickly forgotten to Nationalist benefit.
A narrow No win (say 51%-57%):
The No’s have it by a nose. Despite the agreement reached between Cameron and Salmond, the scope for objection, obfuscation and obstinacy would be considerable with turnout, polling station issues and minor legal transgressions all coming under the spotlight and being challenged either directly or indirectly by the SNP. Stormy calls for a rerun would be made but would largely hinge on the result of the 2016 election. There would be a high risk of a crushing Holyrood defeat for the SNP if they were seen to be sore losers by a public who wanted to move on.
An effective draw (say 49%-51%):
In many ways the nightmare scenario. Significant pressure would be on Salmond or Cameron to publicly and clearly concede defeat if they had just missed out. However, realistically neither side would truly accept the result if they lost by such an excruciatingly narrow margin.
If 49% of Scots want to be part of the UK or independent, then that is too sizeable a bloc to ignore going into either new future. The risk would be an unsettled period for Scotland stretching into the decades and a further referendum, be it to rejoin the UK or on independence, would be inevitable.
The Scottish economy would suffer from the political instability and even a descent towards, if not fully into, Irish style factionalism could be possible. The public may decide to vote a strong majority into Holyrood to manage these downside risks, be it SNP/Green or Labour/Lib Dem, with stability emanating from that mandate. There would, of course, be further complications if Lab/Lib were the first Government of an independent Scotland after such a wafer thin margin or SNP/Green the next Government of devolved Scotland.
A narrow Yes win (say 51%-57%):
This would probably cause more consternation than a narrow No win by simple dint of the establishment being more UK-focussed. The negotiations for an independent Scotland would go ahead but would be a difficult, truculent affair, with impasses likely and legal challenges as to the settlement of assets/liabilities unavoidable. It would be a trying time for public and politicians alike and gaining outside assistance from friendly allies – the European Union or the United Nations – couldn’t be ruled out.
A clear Yes win (say, 57%+):
Negotiations would still be testy but the margin of victory would hasten Cameron and Salmond’s desire to get to a position where rUK has moved on and Scotland is getting on with creating its new future. A compromise settlement would be reached eventually and even former staunch unionist parties would adapt to the new landscape and amend their policies and vision accordingly. Scotland would have more politicians, domestically and, soon enough, at the European Parliament. The standard would take time to improve and plateau with the more established and experienced SNP personalities likely to have a clear run at laying the foundations of the new country.
So they are the possible outcomes, where does the tactical voting come into it? Well, probably only if the polling doesn’t change dramatically between now and 2014.
If the polls in the lead up to the referendum suggest a close run thing then all Scots, my friend included, will simply vote the way they truly believe, be it Yes or No. It’d be the same, one would think, for narrow victories either way.
Similarly, if the Yes vote is considerably outnumbering the No vote, it is difficult to imagine the Yes camp wishing to ensure that the victory is only a narrow one.
However, as outlined at the start of this post, the converse could be true. Some latent national pride within would-be No voters might rise up to give a sizeable consolation Yes tranche that makes the final scoreline look more generous for Yes Scotland, if ultimately still a losing one.
Despite there just being one question, not only is there more than two potential outcomes at this referendum, there are also more than two ways to use your vote.
#1 by Alex Buchan on October 19, 2012 - 11:23 pm
First off, I’d like to say how much I respect and admire your friend. If everyone in Scotland shared that kind of attitude, putting the good of the country first, we would be living, as Alistair Gray commended, as if in a better nation. My analysis runs differently to that outlined. As I said in a previous comment the hall mark of every Western Democracy is that their claim to legitimacy by ruling by consent, rather than by coercion; from that principle very important implications follow. Essentially, it means the state adapts to try to keep an equilibrium of consent.
If we take the example of Quebec. At the last referendum the yes vote lost by a very small margin. In terms of legitimacy the Canadian Federal State had a conditional win they only won just over half of those who voted. In such circumstances the Canadian State had to act to try to re-establish equilibrium by granting more powers, to the extent that Quebec is almost completely autonomous now within Canada. The whole process of devolution for Scotland has also shown this principle in action; the latest powers being the result of the SNP’s victory in 2007. I could cite many other examples including what has been said by commentators about the likely moves that will now take place in Belgium to meet Flemish demands in order to re-establish faith in Belgium on the part of the Flemish.
The implication of all this is that the no camp doesn’t just need to win; they need to win decisively. If the vote share for independence rises during the campaign from where it has been for the last 10 years of around 30% the UK government will have to make moves to shore up Britishness. 57+ would in no way be a comfortable win but would send shock waves through Britain. A draw narrowly in favour of staying in would lead to major changes in how Britain is governed. The English would take it to mean that Scotland is only grudgingly staying in the union, and they would demand their own institutions. This is already happening with people like John Redwood and John Crudas both keen for greater emphasis on an English element the former calling for an English Parliament. A Yes majority for separation is quite a rare event. It is believed that such a result, for instance, wouldn’t have happened in Slovakia where no referendum was in fact held. Because it is so rare, and it is also unexpected, it would lead to acceptance of the fact of Scottish independence by London. But a very decisive no vote say by Shetland would almost certainly be used by the UK Government to their own advantage. A decisive yes vote just aint going to happen.
#2 by Commenter on October 20, 2012 - 12:44 pm
Anecdotally you’re right about Slovakia – the support wasn’t there at the time, although now they’re all for it. I wonder if their story could somehow be made to provide insight to our crop of fearties.
#3 by Craig Gallagher on October 19, 2012 - 11:31 pm
While this is an interesting thought game, Jeff, and although I don’t entirely agree with really any of your predictions as to what would happen in the aftermath of a Yes/No vote, I feel I have to suggest you seem to entirely have missed the point of the Edinburgh Agreement earlier this week. It was an explicit agreement that it was for the Scottish Government to set the terms of the referendum, including what constitutes a Yes vote, and that both Parliaments would accept the result and that the Section 30 order makes it legally watertight.
So what are we talking about here? There is no prospect of the SNP not making it clear that 51%, with whatever turnout, would be a Yes vote. Likewise, there is no prospect of the Yoons saying the same if they scored such a narrow victory. There might be political ramifications, some fractiousness and maybe even post-referendum constitutional quibbles, but I don’t see how either party can push the issue too hard if everyone has already signed an agreement respecting whatever outcome emerges.
It seems to me that the only really scope in this entire spectra for either side to play hardball is if there’s an overwhelming No vote, as it will allow the Yoons to insist there’s clearly no appetite for further devolution of powers to Scotland, and therefore there won’t be any.
#4 by Jeff on October 20, 2012 - 9:05 am
There’s a difference between accepting a Yes or No result but of there is a razor close finish then the Edinburgh Agreement wouldn’t stop legal challenges over, say, campaigning too close to a ballot station, untruths on election leaflets, missing ballot boxes, recounts. All sorts of things. I find it difficult to believe either side would say ‘oh well, 49.8% of the vote. Nearly, better luck next time’.
#5 by Alex Buchan on October 20, 2012 - 10:42 am
This is keeping things all in the narrow world of electoral arithmetic as if the politics doesn’t enter into it. There is a sizable chunk of Tory backbenchers who are totally unfazed by the idea of Scotland leaving. in fact if it came to having to deal with the fall out of such a tight finish in terms of more powers to Scotland and an unstoppable demand for an English Parliament to defend English interests and the prospect of Scotland leaving anyway at some later stage, do you really think that they are going to be arsed with all of this.
We keep forgetting the English dimension. Without specific English institutions they think Scotland is already getting too much attention. They think the united has already gone out of the United Kingdom and would rather Scotland would leave if it’s not happy. We need to try to understand their perspective. What if Dumfries and Galloway kept telling us they used to be an ancient Brythonic kingdom and they kept saying they weren’t actually Scottish and kept asking for more and more bribes (how they see it) to secure there continuing in Scotland, then there would come a point where the rest of Scotland would just say if you want to go then go.
#6 by Alex Buchan on October 20, 2012 - 1:05 am
I hope you don’t think I’m hogging but I’d like to say a little more about your friend. I think that your friend is very astute and I suspect that there are many like him who feel instinctively, regardless of their preferences towards the union, that a heavy defeat for the yes vote would have a bad effect in Scotland and in attitude towards Scotland. I have lives almost half of my adult life in England and the common attitude over the decades of English people I have known is that Scotland should put up or shut up. If Scotland doesn’t want independence they will expect Scotland to take a very quiet back seat from now on. I lived through the period after the 1978 referendum. It was a time when many my age took the attitude that nothing much would ever change and it was best to get out, to London or Australia or the States. This is why I have been so critical of the SNP’s handling of this, because they are playing with Scotland’s future, and a decisive no vote is the quickest route to consign Scotland to slow decline. In such scenario I would expect changes such as the further dumbing down of the BBC, less need for the BBC to take Scotland seriously, any asserting of Scottish grievances about anything will be openly referred to as whining, more open contempt from the likes of David Starkey, Kelvin Mackenzie and Baroness Deech. All of this is why what is needed more than anything is a respectable yes vote, because only such an outcome guarantees the continuation of the gains we have made in self-respect since devolution and through such an out-come we can salvage something from this needlessly all or nothing approach. As Professor James Mitchell has said it’s the Scottish electorate that has been sold out by the Edinburgh Agreement because what they wanted was more powers, not brinksmanship.
#7 by Commenter on October 20, 2012 - 12:49 pm
Your attitude to the SNP is interesting. I believe a lot of the anger and animosity to Salmond is because people feel the SNP are putting them on the spot – they believe their country is too crap to be independent, hate that the SNP are forcing them to follow up their lack of self-confidence with an actual vote, and are displacing their anger by trying to make the whole thing a personality issue about smarmy fatso Salmond. Obviously I’m not lumping everybody into this group – it’d be insultingly simplistic to tar all prospective No voters with this brush, but I think there’s an element of this.
#8 by Alex buchan on October 20, 2012 - 2:43 pm
It’s good that you put in that caveat because that’s not my issue but I agree it is out there. My issue is with tactics. The British State is in decline, there are pressures on it from all sides. The more powers Scotland gets the more lop-sided Britain becomes and the more pressure for change at the centre, neither English Votes for English Laws nor an English Grand Committee is a stable long term solution, and with Scotland returning SNP Governments it is only a matter of time before we see major realignments with Scotland becoming more loosely attached to the UK.
This is a process the Scottish public gives the impression that they are very happy to see continue. The referendum on the other hand if not either won, or run close, will give the British State a new lease of life because it will be seen as endorsement and as a closing down of the issue. It would also demoralise all those seeking change, just like the defeat in 1978. The British state will also learn from the experience and will set up new conditions to be met before any further referendum can be held, quite reasonably contending that they bent over backwards but can’t have the viability of the British State continually tested so they must act to stop this happening again.
Artur Mas in Catalonia and Bart De Wever in Flanders are both reported to be looking for concessions over more powers rather than immediate outright independence, in fact De Wever said “whose talking about independence, I’m not”. Both have more solid support for independence than exists in Scotland. The independence referendum in Catalonia, in being unconstitutional, is widely seen as a bargaining chip to force Spain’s hand. This is sane mainstream European nationalist politics. Scotland has a long history of lacking in pragmatism and over reaching itself only to collapse into self-loathing. The SNP needed to keep its eye on the forward march of more powers until the contradictions inside the British State did the necessary and saw the whole edifice implode which is what would happen if campaigners in England ever got an English Parliament. Instead the SNP have gone for broke, without any guarantee that Scotland will be like Quebec and turnout a reasonable showing for independence. It’s for those reasons that I agree with James Mitchell, because where the people are is for a gradual increase in powers, which also makes political sense, in fact the Scots have more sense than their leaders, both unionist and nationalist.
#9 by Alex buchan on October 20, 2012 - 2:50 pm
Plus your comment just says it all. If Scotland really is at that stage of self-doubt why confuse it by cruxifying it on a totem referendum. Shock therapy might be all very well in a political vacuum, but this isn’t a vacuum and the British State will fully exploit Scotland’s self-doubt.
#10 by Welshguy on October 20, 2012 - 12:01 pm
A close win for the Yes camp might not produce the instability you describe. The Welsh assembly was only instituted on a wafer-thin margin (less than 1% I think) but ever since then it has settled in people’s minds and the institution now enjoys considerable support, in fact polls suggest people think it should have far more power than it does. It might be the case that once independence is instituted many current naysayers accept the new status quo and embrace it.
#11 by cynicalHighlander on October 20, 2012 - 12:47 pm
A narrow No win (say 51%-57%): & A narrow Yes win (say 51%-57%): !
The Yes camp just need to win by 1 vote people might grumble but that is all that is required but the No camp need a much larger win to kick Independence into the long grass.
#12 by Jeff on October 20, 2012 - 12:53 pm
I disagree. Al Gore won the 2000 US election by more than one vote but George W Bush was still the President.
#13 by Tearlach on October 20, 2012 - 7:03 pm
Ah but – and putting aside the electoral college – Al Gore conceded defeat. Bush won through Gore stepping back and saying – basically – oh bugger, fighting this crap is too much hassle. I somehow do not that see that happening in 2014.
#14 by Alex Buchan on October 21, 2012 - 2:05 am
I think a very close finish is unlikely. It took two referendums to get to that point in Quebec. I don’t even think Alex Salmond is expecting that. I think he is hoping to raise the level of support for independence through the campaign and to have also honoured his commitment to the SNP membership of having a referendum on their terms (which he has stressed) on their goal of independence. I think this strategy has negative consequences as I’ve said above.
But to address the issue anyway, the UK government is the only internationally recognised government. So even if the SNP won a majority. If the Northern Isles voted heavily against there would be nothing the Scottish Government could do (short of refusing to participate in any negotiations) to stop the UK Government also entering into separate negotiations with elected representatives from the Northern Isles.
There is one other consideration that make Scotland a very different proposition to say Slovakia, which is the nature of unionism; unionism is not an English imposition. It is part of the patchwork of Scottish society, as Scottish as Nationalism, and has a very long history (Slovakia had only been in union with the Czech Republic since the end of the First World War). In a razor edge finish Scottish unionist politicians may well point to anomalies like a no vote in the capital, or conversely in more than one place (quite likely). Both this and the possibility of potential negotiation with Northern Isles representatives could put the Scottish and UK Governments in a potentially stalemate position.
For all of these reasons I think that at the end of the day Scotland won’t leave the UK through any kind of big bang type event; at least not until the UK has evolved into a looser arrangement, where unionism itself stops meaning anything politically significant. This is in essence what seems to be happening in Belgium where the confederation the Flemish nationalists want is the loosest arrangement one can get within any country.
#15 by Commenter on October 21, 2012 - 4:04 pm
Are the English really so awful as to try and partition Scotland, just to nab a bigger share of oil? It’s something from the fevered imaginations of loopy NI lords, and a pair of scumbag LibDem MPs who should be ashamed of themselves. I really can’t see it happening, but hey – you never know.
#16 by Craig Gallagher on October 21, 2012 - 9:42 pm
I just want to be clear again, because I don’t think you or anyone who has commented afterwards has addressed my point Jeff. There is a legally-binding section 30 order that says the Scottish Parliament will set the terms of the referendum. That means if the SNP says the regional franchise of the Scottish Parliament is the area that would become independent, THAT is what would stop the UK Government, in the event of a Yes vote, negotiating separately with Shetland or Edinburgh or Bearsden.
Part of me thinks the obsession with legal challenges to the referendum fails to acknowledge a basic fact about this process so far, which is that both sides have expressed an urge to have a clear result that everyone can expect. Is it really beyond our capabilities to agree beforehand that 49.5% of the vote does not, in fact, constitute a win for either camp?
#17 by Jeff on October 21, 2012 - 9:46 pm
I’m not saying there’d be a legal challenge to the referendum itself, but Section 30 doesn’t stop legal challenges to how that referendum unfolds.
#18 by Alex Buchan on October 21, 2012 - 10:41 pm
I wanted to clarify that I am not saying that that if the yes vote was 50+% that the UK government would not accept the result. What I’m referring to is the tensions that would be around after such a shock result. It is those tensions that could lead to deadlocked negotiations.
For instance, if the Northern Isles voted no heavily, then they would be portrayed in the London press as loyal supporters of Britain being forced into a break-away state they don’t want and the UK government would be put under great pressure to negotiate some special status for them. Of course this is somewhat hypothetical as I don’t think there will be a majority for independence, unfortunately. That is irrespective of the Section 30 because I am not talking about accepting or not accepting the result, I’m talking about the negotiations over independence that would have to follow.
There is a difference between saying there could be problems due to tensions afterwards and saying that the result would not be accepted. It would be pointless for the UK Government to refuse to accept such a result. This is not like an election; once London lost its legitimacy to govern in Scotland through such a result it would be gone for good. I suspect David Cameron would be advised by his advisors to say that, irrespective of any court actions over the vote, he accepts the will of the Scottish people. But as I said it’s hypothetical as I don’t think it’s going to happen.
#19 by Iain Menzies on October 22, 2012 - 3:26 pm
I dont see that anyone has mentioned turn out.
What worries me is what happens if we get to the point where there is a slim yes vote, even 55% but on a turn out of 60% or less. what happens next? You have a majority of the country that either voted against, or was not convinced enough to vote for. ANd thats before we know what the state of play after negotiations will look like.
What impact will the negotiations have on public opinion? Right now the ‘debate’ over the result of the negotiations is nothing more than a yes we will no we wont game.
What happens if 12 months after the vote there is some kind of rough agreement over say debt levels, and that those levels spook the markets. Scotland will still need to borrow for a good while, if predictions of 6 and 7% interest on bonds start to come out of the markets then what impact does that have on the first indy gov’s spending plan and what does that do to public opinion.
Assuming that day one of indy is say 18 months after the vote is done, what happens if there are 6 months of opinion polling saying that actually scots dont want to go independent. Or less starkly, after a few months of negotiations where things maybe dont go the way people would like them to, what if people start calling for a second referendum to ratify the terms of the negotiation?